What am I?
Watermelon
Watermelon
Two. ‘A’ & ‘Dictionary’
Time.
The twig and the rock were simply distractions used to divert you from the real answer. Forget I ever mentioned them. All you need to do is fill the space between you with enough rope that it makes a pile so big that you can walk across it to the other pillar (remember I said you had an unlimited supply of rope).
Queue.
A: 98
B: 0
C: 1
D: 0
E: 1
It might be expected intuitively that Pirate A will have to allocate little if any to himself for fear of being thrown overboard so that there are fewer pirates to share between. However, this is as far from the theoretical result as is possible.
This is apparent if we work backwards: if all except D and E have been thrown overboard, D proposes 100 for himself and 0 for E. He has the casting vote, and so this is the allocation.
If there are three left (C, D and E) C knows that D will offer E 0 in the next round; therefore, C has to offer E 1 coin in this round to make E vote with him, and get his allocation through. Therefore, when only three are left the allocation is C:99, D:0, E:1.
If B, C, D and E remain, B knows this when he makes his decision. To avoid being thrown overboard, he can simply offer 1 to D. Because he has the casting vote, the support only by D is sufficient. Thus he proposes B:99, C:0, D:1, E:0. One might consider proposing B:99, C:0, D:0, E:1, as E knows he won't get more, if any, if he throws B overboard. But, as each pirate is eager to throw each other overboard, E would prefer to kill B, to get the same amount of gold from C.
Assuming A knows all these things, he can count on C and E's support for the following allocation, which is the final solution.
Death
ALONE – take the “A” and the “L” and you are left with ONE.
The pool was two feet deep! Or the pool was empty!
His job.
Nothing.
54, 58
(x*2, +1, *2, +2, *2, +3, *2, +4)